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The sentience of animals 

Studies show that many of our prevailing views about animals are contradictory and unfounded. In addition to different species having unique abilities, their similarities to humans are greater than we tend to think. 

The way we treat other animals is based on our ideas about their abilities and attributes. Scientific research has produced ample evidence that other animals are similar to humans in all ways that can be considered morally significant. 

All vertebrates experience emotions, and at least their basic emotions are very similar to those of humans. Avoiding injury or death is evolutionarily crucial, which is why emotions developed a long time ago to direct the actions of animals. This also means that emotions are extremely widespread in the whole animal kingdom, present quite similarly in animals from lizards to humans to elephants. In addition to vertebrates resembling humans in these ways, many invertebrates, too, have analogous structures which can function like the emotional brain. 

Experiencing pain and stress is common to all vertebrates as well as invertebrates with a central nervous system. All vertebrates are known to experience suffering – a powerfully emotional feeling of pain, injury and fear. For instance, fish have been found to exhibit similar pain behaviors to mammals. Less research exists on invertebrates, but it is currently assumed that crustaceans suffer from negative experiences. Suffering is not limited to nociception (perceiving tissue damage and reactively avoiding injury) but instead contains a strong emotional component. It has also been argued that even when an animal’s way of sensing pain differs strongly from that of mammals, the animal may experience such powerful fear that its condition ought to be called suffering. The fear system in animals’ brains is very old, and the suffering caused by fear should not be underestimated when it comes to our treatment of fish, for instance. 

Experiencing emotions requires no special cognitive abilities, only a rudimentary form of consciousness. Neither does intelligence mean that the animal experiences emotions more strongly. For a long time, the unfounded assumption has been that so-called unintelligent animals suffer less from negative experiences or pain than so-called advanced species. However, it is possible that cognitively weaker species feel more strongly and are more sensitive to suffering. 

The field of animal behavioral studies no longer refers to “instincts” without an explanation based on emotions, as some mystical force that programs the actions of other animal species. Emotions have been guiding animal behavior for millions of years. Just like humans, other animals rely on their intelligence to associate and connect things and to act in ways that maximize positive emotions and feelings. Maternal instinct, for instance, is no more mystical in other animals than in humans; it is simply an individual’s feelings towards their offspring. A mother hen experiences negative emotions when she sees her offspring harmed, just like a human mother. 

Non-human animals, from fish to lizards to mammals, are aware of the world around them. The level of consciousness likely varies by species, and simply due to differences in sensory perception, each species’ experiential world is probably highly unique. However, a complex or developed consciousness is not a prerequisite for experiencing emotions or suffering; even a very rudimentary form of consciousness is enough. 

There is continuously emerging research showing that many animal species are not only conscious of the world but also of their own existence and of themselves as individuals, just like humans. These include several species of corvids, aquatic mammals, elephants, and pigs. So far, these studies have been conducted only on a few select animal species. 

Humans and other animal species have surprisingly similar needs. Other species, too, need intimacy, species-appropriate challenges, and social activity. They cannot adjust to life in captivity and do not lose their evolutionary needs for things such as friendship or caring for their offspring. Animals in captivity experience stress, fear, pain, anxiety, and loneliness. They also have the capacity for positive emotions such as joy and empathy. These are scientifically proven facts. 

Just like humans, other animals experience anxiety from lack of enrichment and purposelessness. According to research, the situations that cause the most suffering to animals are ones they have no influence on. In experiments where animals were given a choice, even after a long period of hunger, the animal would choose a meal that required strenuous activity instead of the same meal delivered right in front of them. This shows how important the experience of purposefulness and working towards a goal is for other species, too. It is true that wild animals face predation, aggression, sickness, and other unpleasant situations. However, they have the ability to influence their situation: strive away from negative things, curl up in a safe place, fight, or self-medicate. Taking away an animal’s ability to influence its own condition often results in learned apathy, behavioral disorders, or depression. 

Intelligence and the ability to learn are basic attributes for animal species. Even species that have been considered “primitive”, such as lizards, can learn new things and apply their learnings in completely novel situations. Fish also learn, innovate and use tools in inventive ways. In many species, from primates to fish, survival skills are learned from parents or other members of the species. With growing scientific knowledge, many species have surprised humans. Octopuses deceive their researchers. Pigs are more intelligent than dogs. Aquatic mammals, and likely many other species, have their own cultures. Primates and birds have shown signs of having a theory of mind – and so on. 

Intelligence, however, has little to do with the things that can justifiably be considered most essential to our relationship with other animals. Feelings like pain and fear are crucial factors when considering our treatment of animals, and these old, so-called “primitive” attributes have relatively little to do with an animal’s degree of intelligence. In the same way that human intelligence is characteristic of only humans, the intelligence of other species is characteristic and unique only to them. Intelligence and emotions are indisputably present in non-human animals, developed to meet the characteristic needs of each species. 

All the factors that make taking away another human’s freedom unethical are also present in other animals. Considering the rights of non-human animals is a paradigm supported by the natural sciences. When we advocate for animal rights, we want to ensure that animals have the right to live in ways that are natural to them. Variations in levels of intelligence are intrinsic to the human species, yet in moral thought it is not common to argue for limiting individual humans’ rights on these grounds. The typical way humans currently treat members of other animal species is in contradiction with both general moral principles as well as logical thinking. 

The end of animal farming would likely mean the extinction of a few subspecies. On the other hand, continuing our current rate of animal agriculture necessarily means the extinction of many more wild animal species – so ecologically unsustainable is our current animal production. All so-called farm animals are forced to reproduce and live a painful life reduced to a machine, solely because humans maintain their reproduction as one unnecessary form of exploitation. Ending animal farming would therefore not be a sentimental act of releasing animals into the wild; instead, it would be about ending exploitation and forced reproduction. This would not mean killing animals, but the end of killing. 

Noora Kaunisto 
The writer has a master’s degree in ecology and evolutionary biology.

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